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A Brief History of Record Management at the National Archives 
Paul Rock 
What follows is a much abridged version of a section of the opening chapter of 
the official history of criminal justice between 1959 and 1997 which David 
Downes, Tim Newburn and I were formally commissioned to write some six and 
a half years ago.  Our work has been based on numerous archives, secondary 
sources and interviews, but the principal resource, and the principal archive, the 
repository of government records, the ‘strong box of the Empire’, is the 
National Archive at Kew, and it is on record management there that I shall 
dwell.   
One thing that struck us almost immediately, and struck us by surprise, was that 
whole areas of criminal justice history that might have been documented in that 
archive are now blank and irretrievable.  Over and over again, we stumbled 
upon voids in the historical evidence, and we all too often found ourselves 
floundering and foundering.  Thus, although the papers of all Royal 
Commissions and many interdepartmental committees are meticulously 
preserved, the material that must once have documented the deliberations that 
initiated them, and the material that documented their consequences, may no 
longer remain.  There are no files in the Home office relating to Michael 
Williams, the prisoner whose incarceration in Wakefield control unit in 1974 
caused a furore which led to their closure; none on the decision taken in 1929 
to appoint a Select Committee on capital punishment, and none on what 
government made of it; none on the decision to appoint the Wolfenden 
Committee, and none on what government made of it; none on the Home 
Secretary’s decision to accede to representations made in support of an appeal 
against the conviction of three young men for the death of Maxwell Confait, 
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none on the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure that stemmed from the 
appeal, and none on the establishment of the CPS that flowed from the Royal 
Commission.  And so it goes on.  So much has been lost. 
It accordingly seemed sensible to take an expedition to explore how it came 
about that record-keeping in the latter half of the twentieth century seemed to 
have been organised as much by a desire to destroy materials as to preserve 
them.   It offers an interesting small exercise in the sociology of knowledge, 
examining how the past can be made visible,i and what follows is a much 
abridged and simplified account of why so many records have been lost over 
the years. 
The predecessor of the National Archives, the Public Record Office, had been 
founded in 1838 as part of a Benthamite State-building project.  It housed not 
only papers stretching back to the beginnings of record-keeping, but also the 
flow of documents continuously generated by an increasingly energetic state.  It 
was a flow that came into time to clog up and overwhelm not only the PRO but 
also the Government departments which generated it, and officials were at a 
loss about what to do.   
The Archives fell constitutionally under the supervision of the Master of the 
Rolls, the second most senior judge in England and Wales, and, as his name 
suggested, the keeper of the rolls.  But their active management during the 
1940s and 1950s, a critical period, was entrusted to a deputy keeper, Sir Hilary 
Jenkinson, acknowledged to be the chief authority on record-keeping practice in 
the English-speaking world.  It was his firm contention that the role of the 
archivist was solely to receive and conserve the documents that were entrusted 
to him by administrators, that their decision about what to submit should be 
sovereign, and that he could not and should not exercise any discretion in the 
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matter of selection, because the archivist’s discretion would inevitably reflect 
ephemeral prejudices.  Historians, too, were deemed to be ill-equipped to judge 
the possible future value of materials offered for deposit in Chancery Lane 
because scholarly tastes and interests would inevitably shift in unpredictable 
fashion. 
The outcome was simple.  In the period up to and during the Second World 
War, especially, documents began to pile up in what seemed to be 
uncontrollable fashion.  There was a continual resort to ad hoc measures.  
Records were housed under a so-called ‘Limbo’ scheme in emergency storage, 
in deep shelters at London Underground stations, and in specially adapted 
buildings at Hayes and Yeading.  It was never enough.  It was that pressure of 
volume which formed the immediate propellant of change.  But there were four 
other triggers as well: 
 
a) One of our predecessors, Professor Sir William Hancock, the 
Director of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies at the 
University of London, reported in the 1950 Webb Memorial 
Lecture, ‘The History of our Times’, that 12,000,000 files of war 
records in the Board of Trade alone were awaiting the record 
managers’ attention.  They were expected to require 16 miles 
of shelving; existing procedures simply would not be able to 
cope;ii and the fearsome logistical and economic implications of 
what lay ahead alarmed Whitehall.iii  ‘Think’, Sir William warned, 
‘of what is coming to the Public Record Office!’iv  What he said 
was noted and reported by senior Treasury officials responsible 
for funding and answering politically for the PRO. 
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b) Officials also noted and reported the ‘alarm expressed by the 
[1949] Hoover Commissionv on the unwieldy size of public 
records’vi in the United States’, an alarm that led to a radical 
organisational restructuring of record management in 
Washington.  The parallels were clear. 
c) Treasury officials were exercised by the findings of a relatively 
new organisation and methods team that had as a result been 
despatched in 1951 to inquire into the affairs of the PRO.   
There was what a PRO official called ‘the very alarming state of 
affairs revealed by the information produced by Departments in 
response to a questionnaire . . . ‘.vii   
d) And officials were spurred on by the Prime Minister, Sir Winston 
Churchill, who, at yet another time of financial austerity, 
declared himself appalled at plans to spend £300,000 in 1952 
(equivalent to some £8,226,000 at 2015 prices) on filing 
cabinets in Whitehall offices:viii  A senior Treasury official 
recorded that ‘This led the Prime Minister to suggest that we 
ought to devote more attention to destroying old papers so as 
to avoid the demand for a lot of new filing equipment.  I was 
happy to be able to tell the Prime Minister that we had in mind 
the appointment of a Committee to consider this business of 
records.  It is clear that the Prime Minister would like this dealt 
with as a matter of urgency and at a rather high level’.ix   
 
A committee was indeed appointed, under the chairmanship of a 
dyspeptic Sir James Grigg, a former Permanent Secretary at the War 
Department, and supported by Treasury officials.  One thing that the 
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Treasury was intent on from the first was the exclusion of Sir Hilary 
Jenkinson, a man whose archaic ideas were thought to have engendered 
and sustained the crisis of an unsustainable flood of paper, and whose 
sense of authority and personal grandeur were unsupportable.  Sir 
Edward Bridges, the permanent secretary, in charge of establishing the 
committee, said of one preparatory meeting in early January 1952 that 
he was, ‘obviously going to be extremely difficult to deal with.  He was 
touchy and acid to a degree.  He was resentful of the O. & M. 
investigation.  He says that he is the world authority on the subject and 
that everything will be simple if only his methods are adopted at once’.  
His colleague, Edward Playfair, concurred:   concurred, and I hope those 
of a sensitive disposition will not be shocked by the language I am about 
to quote.  Sir Hilary, he said, was an ‘old mountain of prejudice’, ‘a real 
cough-drop. . . . he talks incessantly and is perfectly convinced that he 
knows all the answers’.  The committee would have ‘the most awful 
time’x if Sir Hilary were allowed to join it.  And if Sir Hilary were excluded, 
so, it was argued, should every other civil servant from the PRO. 
 
The Grigg committee was consequently bereft of archival experts.  Its 
emphasis was not on how to choose, house and preserve records.  It was 
on how to destroy them.  A pressing crisis demanded a pressing solution, 
and the committee’s formal terms of reference would be to ‘review the 
arrangements for the preservation of the records of Government 
departments . . . in the light of the rate at which they are accumulating 
and of the purposes which they are intended to serve’.xi    Its conclusion 
was not unpredictable.  There was, it said, a manifest and urgent need to 
reduce the volume of records that could and should be saved.  ‘Few of 
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these’, it declared, ‘will need to be preserved, but their very number 
greatly complicates the process of deciding which should be preserved, 
and which destroyed’.xii    The Master of the Rolls, Lord Evershed, would 
later recall in a memorandum to the Lord Chancellor:  
‘There are in the Public Record Office about 40 miles of Records 
covering the whole period of English history.  The quantity of 
documents now in Government Departments awaiting sorting and 
transfer and representing about 50 years only of administration is 
said to amount to about 1½ times the whole content of the Public 
Record Office. . . . The problem of Departmental Records having 
assumed such proportions that it was in danger of reaching 
administrative breakdown, the “Grigg Committee” . . . was 
appointed by the present Chancellor of the Exchequer and 
myself’.xiii 
The solutions propounded had little to do with the historical value of 
records.  That was not the issue.  An eager commentator pronounced in 
the archival profession’s own mouthpiece, the Journal of the Society of 
Archivists, that ‘The report rightly assumes that a large proportion of the 
documents created in a department should be destroyed as of no value 
to anybody.  Those that are kept must be worthy of the endless trouble 
and expense that their retention will entail – valuable accommodation, 
equipment, cleaning, preservation and repairs through the centuries.  
Selection must be drastic . . . ‘xiv   And with no little irony, the Secretary of 
the Committee could cite Sir Hilary’s own magnum opus, the Manual of 
Archive Administration, to the effect historians and archivists were 
incapable of assessing historical value.   
 
The ensuing  1958 Public Records Act,xv enacted at the very opening of 
our period and still in force whilst we worked,xvi transferred the 
management of the public records to the Lord Chancellor, who, as head 
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of the judiciary, was thought best equipped to assume responsibility for 
legal records;xvii and a newly-created Keeper of the Public Records, 
assisted by an Advisory Council on Public Records, who would be required 
to sift through ‘mountains of records’,xviii and not only decide which were 
to be retained but also control what Theodore Plucknett, Professor of 
Legal History at the London School of Economics, and a former chairman 
of the Master of the Rolls Archives Committee, called the officials’ 
‘dangerous power of destruction’.xix  Closely following the proposals of 
the Grigg Committee, the Act introduced a system of internal 
Departmental reviews to examine which records should continue to be 
retained, and stated merely, under Sec. 3(1), that ‘It shall be the duty of 
every person responsible for public records of any description which are 
not in the Public Record Office or a place of deposit appointed by the 
Lord Chancellor under this Act to make arrangements for the selection of 
those records which ought to be permanently preserved and for their 
safe-keeping’, provided only that, under Sec. 3(2)  ‘Every person shall 
perform his duties under this section under the guidance of the Keeper of 
Public Records and the said Keeper shall be responsible for co-ordinating 
and supervising all action taken under this section’. 
 
Government ministries were in their turn to appoint a suitable internal 
official, a Departmental Records Officer,xx to take charge of their papers, 
review them five years after they had ‘passed out of active use’ (para. 80) 
and then destroy those which were no longer neededxxi (and the first 
such officers were nominated in May 1956 - there were to be officers in 
post in 64 Departments by the end of the next year).  Any records not 
thus discarded were to be reviewed again after 25 years, and those 
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deemed no longer to be of historical or administrative importance were 
to be destroyed (para. 87).  Records that did succeed in passing that 
second muster were to be kept only if they were thought still to be of 
administrative use, and the remainder were to be sent for safekeeping to 
the Public Record Office (although the criteria for identifying historical 
importance were not clearly identified at the time).  That was not to be 
the end of the matter.  Attrition could continue.  The archivists of the 
Public Record Office were obliged to keep their own stock of documents 
under ‘continuous review’ and, in consultation with the relevant 
Departments, dispose of those which were thought no longer to justify 
retention. 
 
Only latterly, and as guidelines for departmental record officers 
crystallised, did criteria for the identification of the public importance of 
records emerge, and that was after Jenkinson had quit the PRO.  The new 
principles seemed to embody a process that had been formulated in 
Washington by Theodore Schellenberg, Jenkinson’s rival for the 
leadership of the archival world.  The 1971 guidelines issued, for instance, 
a series of ‘general descriptions of the main kinds of records which are 
likely to merit selection for permanent preservation at the Public Record 
Office . . . ‘, and they included papers which:  
‘1a.  Show the reasons for important actions or decisions 
   b.  Provide a precedent for future actions or decisions 
 c.  Are a guide to possible action should a similar set of circumstances 
arise in the    future . . .  
   e.  Contain important policy decisions . . .  
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 2.   Records relating to- 
a. The setting-up, proceedings and reports of committees, working 
parties and study groups; 
   b. Important decisions on policy . . .  
   k. Subjects of interest nationally or internationally . . . ‘xxii 
 But, it must be repeated, the prime concentration always appeared to be on 
destruction.  98% of government papers never reach TNA (the image 
conventionally invoked was that for every 100 miles of shelving filled by 
government files each year, TNA could receive only 1 mile). Take figures 
supplied to us by the Home Office for 1989, the last year in which such an 
inventory was taken:  1379 feet of files had been examined at first review, 370 
of which – or some 27% - were destroyed, and 225 feet, or 16% were retained 
for second review.  1202 feet of policy files – or 95% - were destroyed, and 35 
feet – or 3% - were then selected for the PRO at second review.   No doubt 
much that is lost is of little or no value, but the lacunae that the three of us 




i  There is, to be sure, a very broad history of records management by Elizabeth Shepherd, Archives and 
archivists in 20th century England ((2009) Farnham: Ashgate), but it contains none of the detail offered in this 
chapter.  
ii    ‘Time’, he said, ‘does his weeding through the agency of officials working by rules. . . . ‘  
Insufficiently valuable documents were to be destroyed, but ‘Unfortunately, the criteria of value are variable and 
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Record Office can cope with it. . . . Some of the most precious grain of war-historical record never got into the 
registered files and may therefore never come to the Public Record Office:  conversely, in the registered files of 
the war period there are tares by the million; but good wheat is mingled with the tares.  How can they be 
separated?’  ‘The History of our Times’, The Webb Memorial Lecture, 1950, London:  The Athlone Press, pp. 
8-9. 
iii    Note to Edward Playfair, Public Records, 28th December 1951, Treasury file OM68/3/01 
iv    Ibid, p. 8. 
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buildings each the size of the Pentagon.  In 1948, some 18 million square feet of space were filled with records.  
Our task force estimates that, on the basis of rental value alone, the space costs for this volume of records is at 
least 20 million dollars annually’.  And the number of records was increasing alarmingly, from 5m cubic feet in 
1933, to 10m in 1938 and over 15m in 1944.  Its recommendation was that there should be a new Records 
Management Bureau in the Office of General Services; a new Federal Records Management Law to provide for 
the more effective preservation, management, and disposal of Government records; and an ‘adequate records 
management program in each department and agency’ (p. 80). 
vi   Indecipherable, note to Mr Simpson, 29th November 1951, Examination of the Workings of Public 
Records Acts, Treasury file OM68/3/01 
vii    J. Collingridge; ‘Implementing the Grigg Report’, Journal of the Society of Archivists, op. cit.,  p. 179.  
The report revealed that the 53 departments consulted housed some 1,100,000 linear feet of records not still in 
current use but not yet old enough to be reviewed for destruction; and 300,000 linear feet of records awaiting 
possible destruction, of which it was estimated that 50,000 would be passed to the PRO for preservation.   The 
Treasury inquiry into the PRO was only one of a number conducted at the time.  Others included the Tate 
Gallery, the Wallace Collection, the National Maritime Museum and the British Museum. 
viii    His Ministry was responsible for the installation and maintenance of services in the various buildings 
occupied by the PRO. 
ix    Sir Edward Bridges to Mr Simpson, 21st December 1951, Treasury file OM68/3/01. 
x
            Note to Sir Edward Bridges, 1 February 1952, Treasury file OM68/3/01. 
xi    The Times, 28th June 1952. 
xii  Committee on Departmental Records, Report, op. cit., pp. 5-6. 
xiii    Memorandum, Public Record Office and the Grigg Report, undated, PRO 1445 
xiv  P. Jones, ‘The Grigg Report’, op. cit., p. 7. 
xv    The Public Records Act 1958, Chapter 51:  An Act to make new provision with respect to public 
records and the Public Record Office, and for connected purposes.   
xvi    See http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/information-management/best-practice-guide-
appraising-and-selecting.pdf which states that ‘For over 50 years public records bodies have followed the 
system of appraisal established by the Grigg Report in 1954.’ 
xvii
     Notes for Supplementaries, draft statement for the Prime Minister, 1st July 1955, PREM 11 911.  The 
Master of the Rolls wrote to Sir James on the 29th November 1955 to say that ‘One reason which, I confess, 
much influenced me (and I think Bridges also) was the position of the Legal Records.  It seemed to me that any 
difficulties of segregation would be best dealt with if the Lord Chancellor were Head of All Records. . . . ‘ 
PJGG10(2) Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge.  The decision had been taken  against Sir James’ advice.  He 
told the Master of the Rolls ‘As you know I was not consulted with the Treasury decided to make the Lord 
Chancellor the Minister responsible for departmental records and I do not agree with the decision’.  Note to, 12 th 
March 1957, PJGG10(2) Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge.   
xviii    See T. Plucknett; ‘The Public Records Act 1958’, The Modern Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 2 (March 
1959), p. 182. 
xix    Ibid  
xx
    The prime duty of the Officer was described as being ‘to ensure that his function is as widely known 
within his department as possible and, in particular, that he is regarded as the authoritative, natural source of 
advice on any matters connected with records’.  Manual of Records Administration, Public Record Office, 
February 1983, 2.1.3.   
xxi    The first reference in the files to the proposed new system was an anonymous note, dated the 25 
October 1952, which made no allusion to the origin of the scheme other than to ‘the various ideas on this subject 
that have been ventilated in discussion and elsewhere’.  Treasury file OM68/6/09. 
xxii    Reproduced in P. Hennessy; ‘Whitehall guidelines on preservation of documents are made public’, The 
Times, 7th March 1978. 
